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Collective bargaining agreements under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) may include union shop provisions, which compel all of a company's
employees to pay dues to the union, regardless of whether or not those employ-
ees support the union or agree with the way the dues are spent.' Disgruntled
employees have on a number of occasions launched First Amendment challeng-
es to this practice.' In considering those challenges, the Supreme Court has
wrestled with the issue of whether the union's actions constitute state action,'
for governmental actors alone are subject to the constrictions of the First
Amendment.
The Supreme Court has yet to articulate a clear standard for determining
whether state action exists in union shop provisions and, therefore, whether a
constitutional challenge can be brought against such provisions. Indeed, the
Court has reached contradictory results when interpreting the virtually identical
union shop provisions of the two major labor law statutes. The Court has found
state action in collective bargaining agreements negotiated under the Railway
Labor Act (RLA),4 but has suggested that state action is not present in the case
of NLRA provisions.
5
This unresolved question of whether state action exists in union shops that
are governed by the NLRA bears significant implications for labor law-im-
plications that extend well beyond the First Amendment context. Over six
million workers in the United States are employed under NLRA union shop
provisions that compel them to pay union dues regardless of whether they
choose to join the union.6 Consequently, the characterization of these provi-
1. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
2. See infra Part I (discussing cases).
3. The term "state action" refers generically to actions of the federal, state, and local governments.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST1TMrIONAL LAW 1688 n.2 (2d ed. 1988); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 507 n.15 (1985); Henry C. Strickland, The State Action
Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 592 (1991).
4. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988). State action has been found in Ellis v. Brother-
hood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
5. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
6. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National LaborRelations Act: The
Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. I. ON LEGIS. 51, 53 (1990).
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sions as state action directly affects the ability of these workers to challenge
the constitutionality of the use of their dues. Yet confusion regarding the rights
of these workers persists because the Supreme Court has not provided a clear
answer to the issue, and the lower courts remain divided.
7
In addition to its financial consequences for dissenting union members, the
state action question bears on other issues in labor law. For example, state
action implicates the ability of employees to challenge collective bargaining
agreements that have a discriminatory effect,' a union's failure to pursue an
employee's grievance for discriminatory reasons,9 and union rules that limit
campaign contributions during union elections. 0 A finding of state action
under the NLRA could have significant consequences for individual employees
in each of these situations by providing them with constitutional protection
against the actions of a union.
This Note examines the Supreme Court's inconsistent approach to this state
action question and concludes that state action does exist when parties negotiate
collective bargaining agreements under the NLRA. By empowering labor unions
to serve as the exclusive representatives of all employees in companies in which
union shop provisions have been negotiated, and by compelling those employ-
ees to pay union dues, the federal labor statutes facilitate the very deprivation
of employee rights alleged in a constitutional challenge. As a result, courts
should consider the substantive merits of constitutional challenges to NLRA
union shop agreements, rather than dismissing those cases on state action
grounds. This Note does not argue for a reconceptualization of the state action
doctrine. Rather, it accepts the doctrine as it now stands and argues that state
action is present because of the particular characteristics of federal labor law.
Part I of this Note reviews the Supreme Court cases concerning the exis-
tence of state action in union shop agreements under the RLA or the NLRA.
Part II examines the state action doctrine in order to develop a useful frame-
work for analyzing the state action issue in labor law. Part Im applies that
framework to collective bargaining agreements negotiated under the NLRA and
finds that state action results from the federal government's role in facilitating
the union's exclusive representation and in permitting union shop agreements.
7. Three circuit courts, and district courts in two other circuits, have held that state action is present
under the NLRA. See Hammond v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers Union, 462 F.2d 174, 175 (6th
Cir. 1972); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 16 (Ist Cir. 1971); Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
427 F.2d 996, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 1970); Havas v. Communications Workers, 509 F. Supp. 144, 147-48
(N.D.N.Y. 1981); Lykins v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 510 F. Supp. 21,25 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Two other
circuit courts have reached the opposite result. See Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 474-80 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 410 (10th Cir. 1971).
8. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (no state action in Title VII challenge to
affirmative action plan); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (state action can arise where
collective bargaining agreement discriminates against black employees).
9. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
10. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 121 n.16 (1982) (absence of state actionprecludes
First Amendment challenge to restriction on contributions during union elections).
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I. STATE ACTION AND ITS APPLICATION TO LABOR LAW BY THE COURT
The two major federal labor statutes-the RLA and the NLRA-permit the
inclusion of union shop provisions in collective bargaining agreements." If
a union governed by one of these statutes successfully negotiates for the inclu-
sion of such a provision, all employees become obligated to join the union
within thirty days. 2 This requirement is significantly limited, however, by an
additional provision in the statute that prohibits discharge "for reasons other
than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership."'13
Thus, as long as an employee continues to pay dues, he does not have to
participate in any other union activities. In this way, "'[m]embership' as a
condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core."' 4 Individuals
who pay dues without otherwise participating in union activities are commonly
characterized as dissenting union members.
This arrangement is not always satisfactory for employees who may object
either to paying any money to the union or to particular union expenditures.
These objections have led dissenting union members to challenge the use of
their dues as an infringement of their First Amendment rights. In cases involv-
ing public sector employees, where state action clearly exists because the state
is an actual party to the collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court
has held that dissenting employees have a legitimate constitutional interest in
challenging the use of their dues. "To compel employees financially to support
their collective-bargaining representative has an impact upon their First Amend-
ment interests"' 5 because "one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and
11. Railway Labor Act, § 2, Eleventh (a), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1988); National Labor Relations Act, §
8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988). The only significant difference in regard to union shops is that the RLA
provision expressly preempts state law on the subject, whereas the NLRA permits states to prohibit union
shops if they desire, an issue that is dealt with more extensively infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
12. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(3); see also Railway Labor Act, § 2, Eleventh (a) (60 days).
For a general discussion of union shop provisions, see THOMAS R. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM,
THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS (1977); Billie A. Brotman & Thomas J. McDonagh, Union Security Clauses
as Viewed by the National Labor Relations Board, 37 LAB. LJ. 104 (1986).
13. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(3)(ii)(B); Railway Labor Act, § 2, Eleventh (a). The original
provision of the NLRA did not prohibit unions from requiring that all employees be active union members.
See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § (8)(3), Pub. L. No. 74-198,49 Stat. 449,452 (1935)
(codified as amended at29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988)). The 1947 amendments to the Act added the provision
limiting the requirement for membership to the payment of dues. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136.
14. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734,742 (1963). This "whittling down" means that union
shop provisions under the NLRA are not really "true union shops," which would require active participation
in the union. See HAGGARD, supra note 12, at 36-37. They are also not"closed shops," which would require
that an employee already be a member of the union in order to be hired. Id. at 36. Instead, § 8(a)(3) requires
that an employee have 30 days after his employment begins to join the union.
15. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) (requirement of dues in case involving
public union creates constitutional infringement).
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his conscience rather than coerced by the State."' 6 While the government
interest in permitting union shop agreements may override employees' First
Amendment interests in some instances, 7 in other instances courts have pro-
hibited particular union expenditures. 8
Because the Supreme Court has accepted challenges on the merits to the
use of union dues in cases where the state is a party, the only barrier to a
constitutional challenge to compulsory union dues in the private sector is a
finding of state action. In cases involving the RLA and the NLRA, where the
state is not an actual party to the agreement, the Court has had difficulty
determining whether restrictions on employee rights can be attributed to the
government. This part of the Note examines how those cases have resolved that
question.
A. State Action Under the Railway Labor Act
The Supreme Court has consistently found state action in union shop
provisions negotiated under the Railway Labor Act; however, the Court has
provided only limited exposition in support of this conclusion. The Court first
considered the issue in the 1956 case Railway Employes' Department v.
Hanson,19 in which employees of the Union Pacific Railroad claimed that a
union shop provision in their collective bargaining agreement was unconstitu-
tional. The Court concluded that state action was present because "the federal
statute is the source of the power and authority by which any private rights are
lost or sacrificed. '2 Part of the reasoning in the opinion focused on a provi-
sion of the RLA that explicitly overrode state attempts to prohibit union shop
agreements.2 ' The Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, explained that this
federal preemption provision meant that a union shop agreement "by force of
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, could not be made
illegal nor vitiated by any provision of the laws of a State."'  In fact, the
Nebraska Constitution, which had been applied by the Nebraska Supreme Court
16. Id. at 235; see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1960 (1991); cf. Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("[The] right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment
and against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."),
quoted in Lenhert, 111 S. Ct. at 1957; West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (government cannot force individual to salute flag or recite pledge of allegiance), cited in Abood,
431 U.S. at 235. But see Norman L. Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency Shop, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
61 (1983) (compulsory union dues are not First Amendment violation).
17. See Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1960.
18. Id. at 1963-66 (prohibiting expenditures of dissenting members' dues on lobbying and litigation
expenses of other bargaining units).
19. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
20. Id. at 232.
21. Railway Labor Act, § 2, Eleventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1988) (authorizing union security agreements
"[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute or law of the United States,
or Territory thereof, or of any State").
22. 351 U.S. at 232.
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in the case, contained a provision prohibiting union security agreements. Thus,
absent the RLA, the dissenting union members would not have been compelled
to pay dues.2
While the Court accepted the argument concerning the existence of state
action, it held against the dissenting union members on the merits. It reasoned
that the congressional goal of promoting industrial peace and collective bargain-
ing justified any infringement on constitutional rights resulting from union
security agreements that require the payment of dues to fund collective bargain-
ing expenses.24 However, the Court emphasized that its ruling was confined
to the facts before it and did not preclude future consideration of challenges
to the use of dissenting members' dues for purposes other than collective
bargaining. The Court explained, "If other conditions are in fact imposed...
in contravention of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the
decision in that case."
' 5
The Court next considered the state action issue five years later in Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, in which a group of dissenting union
members challenged their union's use of membership dues for contributions
to political campaigns.2 The Court reaffirmed its conclusion in Hanson that
the use of dissenting members' dues, which were compelled by a union security
agreement negotiated under the RLA, involved state action.27 However, the
Court held that because the statute itself prohibited the use of dissenting
members' dues for political purposes, the case could be decided without reach-
ing the constitutional issue.'
Finally, in 1984, in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship
Clerks, the Court considered a challenge by dissenting union members who
objected to the use of their dues for purposes unrelated to collective bargain-
ing.29 The Court reasoned that unlike the political contributions in Street, the
RLA permitted some of the challenged expenditures here. Consequently, union
expenditures for publications unrelated to collective bargaining, expenses for
attending union conventions, and expenses for union social hours could only
be challenged on constitutional grounds. 3°
In deciding the First Amendment question, the Ellis Court presumed the
existence of state action and, as a result, did not feel compelled to analyze the
issue. Instead, it simply cited Hanson and stated: "The First Amendment does
23. The fact that federal preemption was a ground for finding state action does not mean that other
factors would not also support that conclusion. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
24. 351 U.S. at 233-38.
25. Id. at 238.
26. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
27. Id. at 746-49 (reviewing Hanson).
28. The Court considered a very similar issue two years later in Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v.
Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963). In that case, the Court reached the same result that it had in Street and relied
heavily on Street's logic.
29. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
30. Id. at 455-57.
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limit the uses to which the union can put funds obtained from dissenting
employees. '31 The Court then considered the level of constitutional infringe-
ment resulting from the expenditures and found the expenses at issue de
minimis, and thus constitutionally permissible.32 Nevertheless, by considering
the merits of the argument, the Court revealed again its conclusion that state
action exists when parties subject to the RLA negotiate union security agree-
ments.
B. State Action Under the National Labor Relations Act
While the RLA cases have provided a clear but cursory answer to the state
action question, only brief dictum in one Supreme Court case, Communications
Workers v. Beck, has addressed the issue of state action for union shop provi-
sions negotiated under the NLRA.33 In that case, dissenting members of a
union operating with a union shop provision challenged the union's decision
to spend their dues on various activities, such as lobbying; participation in
social, charitable, and political events; and efforts to organize employees in
other workplaces. After the Court carefully analyzed the permissibility of the
expenditures under the NLRA's statutory language, it concluded that the Act
prohibited charging those expenses to dissenting union members. The Court
reasoned that because the language and legislative history of the NLRA and
the RLA were so similar, many of the same factors that had led to the prohibi-
tion of such expenditures under the RLA in Street and Ellis also applied in
Beck24
The conclusion that the NLRA itself prohibited such expenditures made
any consideration of the state action issue irrelevant because the case could be
decided without turning to the constitutional question. Thus, at the end of the
opinion the Court commented: "We need not decide whether the exercise of
rights permitted, though not compelled, by section 8(a)(3) involves state
action. '35 Yet immediately after that sentence, the Court provided citations
with parenthetical explanations to two cases that suggested no state action exists
in NLRA union shop agreements.
36
31. Id. at 455.
32. Id. at 456 ("[We perceive little additional infringement of First Amendment rights beyond that
already accepted, and none that is not justified by the governmental interests behind the union shop itself.").
33. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
34. Id. at 747-54.
35. Id. at 761.
36. Id. (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982)). The Beck conclusion contradicted the one reached by the Fourth Circuit
in ihe case, which also noted that state action analysis was unnecessary for deciding the case, but neverthe-
less concluded "that there is governmental action sufficient to sustain jurisdiction." Beck v. Communications
Workers, 776 F.2d 1187, 1205 (4th Cir. 1985).
The Court did not refer to two other cases that would suggest the presence of state action. See Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). Those cases
are considered in greater detail later in this Note. See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
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It is difficult to ascertain whether this dictum, which consists only of one
sentence and two citations, indicates that the Court has actually resolved the
state action issue. One plausible reading of the language suggests that the Court
was signaling its conclusion that no state action exists under the NLRA.
Professor Dau-Schmidt supported this reading in an article arguing against the
presence of state action in labor law. He explained that the Court's dictum
"would seem to defeat any arguments that a union's actions in negotiating and
observing a union security agreement are state actions."
37
Yet even if Beck is not read to stand for that proposition, the case does
highlight the fact that the question of state action under the NLRA remains
unanswered. Since the Court will likely confront the question again in the near
future, the question of state action remains important.38 The recent trend
toward restricting the state action doctrine suggests that the current Court may
be less willing to find state action than was the Hanson Court in 1956.
39
Moreover, the circuit split on the issue demonstrates that the finding of state
action under the RLA does not inevitably lead to the finding of state action
under the NLRA.4
Regardless of whether the Beck Court misanalyzed or simply failed to
analyze the question of state action, the issue warrants more attention than the
single, passing sentence it received. The resolution of the state action question
has important substantive consequences for the six million workers governed
by the NLRA.41 While the decision in Beck held that the statute prohibited
some uses of dues paid by dissenting union members, the opinion left other
uses of dues unaffected. As Ellis demonstrated, a number of possible union
expenditures can survive scrutiny under the labor statutes, but not under the
Constitution.42 Without a finding of state action for employees covered by the
NLRA, those employees will continue to be denied constitutional protections
that employees governed by the RLA enjoy. In addition to the monetary
benefits for workers that could result from a finding of state action, such a
finding could implicate other constitutional concerns briefly considered at the
end of this Note.
4 3
37. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 6, at 70-71; accord Lisa Rhode, Note, Section 8(a)(3) Limitations to the
Union's Use of Dues-Equivalents: The Implications of Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 57
U. CIN. L. REV. 1567, 1585 (1989) (noting that Beck's suggested there is no state action in NLRA collective
bargaining agreements).
38. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 6, at 117.
39. See Strickland, supra note 3, at 589; Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern
State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.. 683, 700-21 (1984).
40. See cases cited supra note 7.
41. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 6, at 53.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
43. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
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II. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
The U.S. Constitution protects individuals from actions by the government,
not actions by private parties. As a result, the fact "[t]hat an act violates the
Constitution when committed by a government official... does not answer the
question whether the same act offends constitutional guarantees if committed
by a private" individual." Even assuming, as is likely the case,45 that the
Supreme Court would find that compelled union dues raise legitimate First
Amendment concerns, dissenting union members would not necessarily prevail
when challenging the use of their dues under union shop agreements. Instead,
those employees would first have to demonstrate that "the conduct allegedly
causing the deprivation of [the] federal right [can] be fairly attributable to the
State."4
This part of the Note examines the elements of the state action doctrine
relevant to determining whether state action exists under the NLRA. The first
section reviews the general principles underlying the doctrine. The second
section then examines two state action tests likely to be employed by courts
in analyzing the doctrine's applicability to the NLRA.
Part II does not offer a normative argument for reforming the state action
doctrine.47 Instead, it examines the current doctrine in order to develop an
analytical framework for Part III, which considers the doctrine in the specific
context of the NLRA. Part III then argues that under the Supreme Court's
prevailing state action framework, union shop agreements constitute state action.
Thus the failure to find state action under the NLRA is a result of courts not
accurately recognizing critical attributes of labor law, rather than of a
mischaracterization of the state action doctrine.
A. The Function of the State Action Doctrine
Making sense of the state action doctrine is not an easy task. The doctrine
is regularly criticized and has frequently been characterized as "a conceptual
disaster area"''4 for which "[t]here still are no clear principles." 49 Neverthe-
44. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1991).
45. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
46. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
47. For two such arguments, see Chemerinsky, supra note 3, and Ronna G. Schneider, The 1982 State
Action Trilogy: Doctrinal Contraction, Confusion, and a Proposal for Change, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1150 (1985).
48. Charles Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14,81 HARV. L. REV. 69,95 (1967); see also Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private
Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289, 1290 (1982) (Black's characterization of the
doctrine "would appear even more apt today.'); Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate
Virtues: Do PubliclPrivate Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1484 n.156 (1982) ("The whole
state action area appears now, more than ever, a shambles.").
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less, "[d]espite both the predictions of and the call for the demise of the state
action doctrine," the Court continues to apply it.5" This continuing application
necessitates an understanding of the doctrine's general principles.
The state action doctrine is used to identify "where the governmental sphere
ends and the private sphere begins,"'" thereby preventing the application of
public, constitutional limitations to the private realm. This limitation is tradi-
tionally thought to further three policies: preservation of individual liberty,
federalism, and separation of powers.52
The state action doctrine enhances individual liberty by permitting private
parties "to structure their private relations as they choose subject only to the
constraints of statutory or decisional law."53 Without this limitation, the fear
of intruding on constitutional rights might unduly chill private action. For
example, in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, the Supreme Court
held that the sanctions imposed by a private athletic association did not consti-
tute state action." Had the Court found state action, the university would have
been required to comply with constitutional due process requirements before
firing Tarkanian. In contrast, the Court's decision in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., which found state action when civil litigants exercise peremptory
challenges to petit jurors in federal trials, required those litigants to meet the
Constitution's equal protection standards for jury selection.55
The state action doctrine also enhances federalism because the doctrine
stems from "a recognition that there are areas of private rights upon which
federal power should not lay a heavy hand and which should properly be left
to the more precise instruments of local authority. '56 In Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., the Court held that because a state-regulated utility operated
as a private party, its decision to terminate service for customers delinquent in
paying their bills was not subject to constitutional due process standards.57 The
Jackson decision promoted federalism by leaving the state free to regulate its
utilities without the additional constraints of the Federal Constitution.
49. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 503-04; see also Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A
Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SuP. Cr. REV. 221,
221.
50. Kevin Cole, Federal and State "State Action": The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized
Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 334 (1990).
51. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1991); see also National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
349 (1974); Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 504.
52. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1691; william M. Burke & David J. Reber, "State Action,"
Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAl. L. REV.
1003, 1014-17 (1973); Cole, supra note 50, at 345.
53. Edmonson, II1 S. Ct. at 2082; see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
But see Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 542 (state action doctrine harms individual liberty by preventing
government from addressing violations of individual constitutional rights by private entities).
54. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
55. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
56. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963).
57. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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Finally, the state action doctrine promotes separation of powers. "By
limiting the scope of the rights which the Constitution guarantees, the state
action requirement limits the range of wrongs which the federal judiciary may
right in the absence of congressional action... . -s5 This concern of the state
action doctrine recognizes that congressional authority to protect constitutional
rights is broader than judicial authority to do the same.59 For example, while
Congress can use the Commerce Clause to prevent privately owned hotels and
restaurants engaging in interstate commerce from discriminating against custom-
ers,6 the state action doctrine would prohibit the Court from creating that
protection in the absence of a congressional statute.
B. State Action Tests
While the general principles of the state action doctrine are easily recog-
nized, "formulating an infallible test" for identifying state action is an "impos-
sible task. '61 Instead, state action analysis depends on the particular factual
context under analysis.62 Consequently, the Court has articulated a variety of
tests for resolving state action claims. 63 This section examines two tests that
seem appropriate for a state action analysis of collective bargaining agreements
negotiated under the NLRA. One is the general state action test introduced in
the 1982 case of Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,' which sets out a two-step
approach to state action questions. The second is the "nexus" test that emerged
in Jackson and is applicable where government regulations underlie the claim
of state action. The nexus test focuses on the link between the government
regulation and the alleged constitutional violation.65 While in some senses it
is an alternative to the Lugar test, the nexus test is particularly helpful in
understanding whether the second part of the Lugar inquiry has been satisfied.
58. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1691.
59. Cole, supra note 50, at 347.
60. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964).
61. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
62. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) ("Only by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its
true significance."); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (quoting Burton).
63. For attempts to categorize the state action cases, see Barbara R. Snyder, Private Motivation. State
Action and the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1053, 1063-84 (1990) (arguing that Court's varied approaches are confused when action is by both state
and private actors); Strickland, supra note 3, at 596-633 (arguing that the Court employs various tests
depending on fact situation rather than on any single state action formula).
64. 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
65. 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (rearticulating
nexus test).
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1. The Lugar Two-Part Test
In Lugar, the Court began its analysis of a state action challenge by
reviewing its major decisions in the area. According to the Court, its prior state
action decisions suggested the existence of a general two-part test for determin-
ing when state action exists in a particular case.
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible.... Second,
the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state
official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant
aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable
to the State.6"
The Lugar Court employed the test to conclude that the role of Virginia
officials in assisting in prejudgment attachments of property constituted state
action. The Court reasoned that because the "State ha[d] created a system"
where state officials were statutorily required to attach property at the request
of private parties, state action was present.67 Thus, the first part of the test was
met because the state had created the relevant legal framework; the second part
was met because state officials-literal state actors-enforced the system.
Last Term, the Court confirmed the continued viability of this test in
Leesville Concrete, finding state action when private litigants exercise peremp-
tory challenges to exclude black jurors in a civil trial.68 The Court held that
the first part of the Lugar test was met because peremptory challenges are a
creation of the government.69 The second part of the test was met because
without the assistance of government officials in creating and executing a
system of juries and peremptory challenges, such challenges could not take
place.7" In addition to providing another example of the application of the
Lugar test, Leesville Concrete also demonstrates the Court's willingness to
apply the test beyond the § 1983 context in which it was created.7'
66. 457 U.S. at 937.
67. Id. at 942.
68. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
69. Id. at 2083.
70. Id. at 2083-84.
71. In deciding Leesville Concrete, which was not a § 1983 case, the Court placed significant reliance
upon Lugar. The Court explained: "We begin our discussion within the framework for state action analysis
set forth in Lugar." Id. at 2082. The Court then carefully applied the test to the facts of the case. Id. at 2083-
87.
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2. The Jackson Nexus Test
While Lugar provides a useful general framework for beginning state action
analysis, the fact-dependent nature of the doctrine72 necessitates consideration
of other state action theories. This point is highlighted by the Lugar Court's
explanation of the second part of its two-part test, noting the variety of ways
in which a party can be considered a state actor.73 An examination of the state
action cases confirms this conclusion.74 For example, state action claims can
be based on actual conduct by state officials,75 the state's role in enforcing
private law,76 joint action by private actors and state officials,77 actions by
a private party that cause the party to take on the functions of a governmental
entity,78 or direct government regulation of the conduct of a private party.
79
This last theory-the influence of government regulation-is most applica-
ble to the state action claim in labor law.80 This Note argues that although
labor unions are private parties, they can be characterized as state actors
because of the role of the federal labor law statutes in regulating collective
bargaining agreements. Those statutes create a regulatory framework governing
collective bargaining agreements that differs significantly from the system that
would otherwise exist. The importance of such a difference for state action
purposes is highlighted by three major Supreme Court decisions over the past
twenty years that recognized the possibility of state action existing as a result
of government regulation. Those cases indicate that government regulation of
private action can lead to a finding of state action when the link between the
government activity and the challenged behavior is very strong.
72. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
73. 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
74. See supra note 63.
75. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988) ("A state
university without question is state actor."); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) ("public employee acts
under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant
to state law"); Burke & Reber, supra note 52, at 1045; Strickland, supra note 3, at 599.
76. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court enforcement ofprivate covenant that was racially
discriminatory constitutes state action). But see Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 526 ("The Supreme Court,
however, has recoiled from this conclusion and largely has refused to apply Shelley."); Ronna G. Schneider,
State Action-Making Sense Out of Chaos-An Historical Approach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737, 754 (1985)
("Subsequent decisions have shown that the Court has not given an expansive reading to Shelley.').
77. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) ("The State had so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private party] that it must be recognized as
a joint participant in the challenged activity."). But see Strickland, supra note 3, at 624 (Burton is often
cited but generally not used to find state action).
78. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town functions in the same way a public
town functions and therefore could be considered state actor). But see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976) (employer does not violate First Amendment by prohibiting labor union from distributing handbills
on company property); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (private owner of shopping mall does
not violate First Amendment by prohibiting distribution of handbills on mall).
79. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
80. See infra Part ILA.
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In the 1974 case Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,"1 the Court consid-
ered the state action doctrine when the plaintiff claimed that a private utility's
termination of her electric service violated the Due Process Clause. Although
the utility was heavily regulated by the government, the Court found no state
action. Rather than simply equating government regulation with state action, 2
the Court explained instead that "the inquiry must be whether there is a suffi-
ciently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself."
83
This nexus inquiry also received significant attention in two 1982 cases that
were part of a trilogy that included Lugar. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Court
held that a private school was not a state actor when it fired one of its teachers
even though it received significant state funding and was subject to extensive
state regulation.' The Court relied on the nexus test put forth in Jackson,
explaining that while the school was heavily regulated by the state, its decisions
to terminate employees were not subject to state regulation. 5
In Blum v. Yaretsky, the Court found no state action in a decision by a
nursing home to transfer Medicaid patients to a lower level of care, even though
the decisions occurred after periodic assessments required by state and federal
law. 6 Because the transfer decisions were ultimately based on the independent
medical judgments of private physicians, the Court reasoned that no state action
was present.8 7 The Court rejected respondent's argument that the government
was attempting to encourage a particular discharge policy.
While the Court found no state action in any of these three cases, the
opinions offer guidance for determining the existence of state action in the case
of a highly regulated private entity. As the Court explained in Blum, state action
is present when the state "has exercised coercive power or has provided such
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law
be deemed to be that of the State."88 This standard, along with the facts of
these three cases, suggests that the state action inquiry must focus on whether
the state is attempting to bring about its own policy choice through regulations.
81. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
82. Id. at 350.
83. Id. at 351; see also Thomas R. McCoy, Current State Action Theories, the Jackson Nexus
Requirement, and Employee Discharges by Semi-Public and State-Aided Institutions, 31 VAND. L. REV.
785, 807 (1978); Phillips, supra note 39, at 704.
84. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
85. Id. at 841-42.
86. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
87. Id. at 1008 ("[Djecisions ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according
to professional standards that are not established by the State.").
88. Id. at 1004, quoted in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982), and San Francisco Arts
& Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,546 (1987); cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972) (holding private club's discrimination was not state action despite regulation by
Liquor Control Board because that regulation "plays absolutely no part in establishing or enforcing the
membership or guest policies of the club that it licenses to serve liquor").
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The combination of the Lugar test and the government regulation cases
provides a framework for analyzing state action under the NLRA. First, it is
necessary to inquire whether the alleged First Amendment violations are
conduct authorized by statute, in this case the NLRA. Second, it is necessary
to determine whether union officials can be considered state actors because they
have received significant assistance from the government's regulatory policy.
The standard set forth in Jackson indicates that the second element of the Lugar
test requires a strong nexus between the government regulation and the claimed
deprivation of rights. Use of this analytical framework blends together two
different formulae for state action, but that is not surprising given the depen-
dence of state action analysis on the particular factual context. In fact, Leesville
Concrete,8 9 as well as one of the circuit court cases'e analyzing state action
under the NLRA, applied both the Lugar framework and the Jackson nexus test.
III. RETHINKING STATE ACTION AND THE UNION SHOP: CONSIDERATION OF THE
COERCIVE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION
This part of the Note examines the issue of state action in union shop
provisions negotiated under the NLRA by applying the framework established
in Part II. It argues that state action exists in such provisions because the
statutory requirement of exclusivity compels all employees to work under the
terms negotiated by the majority union. Consequently, dissenting union mem-
bers are obligated to pay dues despite their opposition to both the union and
the payment of dues. In this way, Congress "has cast the weight of the Federal
Government behind the agreements just as surely as if it had imposed them by
statute." 91
This argument is distinct from Hanson's discussion of how the preemptive
effect of federal labor law produces state action under the RLA.92 Unlike the
RLA, which preempts state efforts to prohibit union shop agreements, the
NLRA permits states to prohibit such agreements.93 Currently, twenty-one
states have chosen to do so,94 a fact which has led some courts and commenta-
tors to conclude that no state action exists under the NLRA because its union
security provisions do not preempt law in those states. 95 This approach to state
89. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
90. Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
91. Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 419 U.S. 1093, 1095 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); accord Havas v. Communications Workers, 509 F. Supp. 144, 149
(N.D.N.Y. 1981) ("the federal government has affirmatively put its omnipresent weight and power" behind
such agreements).
92. Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956). For discussion of this argument,
see supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
93. National Labor Relations Act, § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1988).
94. 7 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 730:19-20 (1991).
95. Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 474-80 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
443 F.2d 408, 410 (10th Cir. 1971); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 6, at 111.
1148 [V/ol. 101: 1135
Union Shop Provisions
action presumes that the focal point of analysis should be the applicability of
the Supremacy Clause.
Such a conclusion suffers from two major flaws. First, it misreads Hanson,
which depended on "the Congressional imprimatur placed on union shop
clauses," not the preemption provision of the RLA.9 6 The fact that the preemp-
tion provision was indicative of the federal influence on the process does not
mean that it was the only relevant indicator of state action. Preemption was
relevant in Hanson because it demonstrated that "the federal statute is the
source of the power and authority by which any private rights are lost or
sacrificed."97 It is also quite possible that other provisions in the labor statutes
could be "the source of power and authority." The Hanson Court recognized
this possibility and suggested an alternative basis for finding state action in a
footnote: "Once courts enforce the agreement the sanction of government is,
of course, put behind them."98 Yet even if the state action in Hanson is an-
chored in the RLA's preemption provision, that should not preclude the Court
from considering alternative bases of state action.
Indeed, reliance on the RLA preemption theory of state action may not
even be very sound. It is surely not the case that any time the federal govern-
ment preempts state law, state action exists. As Professor Wellington explained
five years after Hanson was decided, if the preemption theory were adopted,
"[it would mean] that all private action taken under the authority of federal
legislation that occupies a field by that token alone becomes governmental
action."99 Consequently, Hanson's reliance on federal preemption does not
eliminate the need to consider other possibilities for finding state action.
A. Part One of the State Action Test
The first part of the Lugar state action test inquires whether "the claimed
constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege
having its source in state authority."'" Collective bargaining under the NLRA
satisfies this part of the test by conferring two rights on labor unions: the power
to negotiate exclusively and the power to negotiate union shop provisions. At
the same time, the conferral of these privileges on the majority union deprives
dissenting union members of rights that they would otherwise retain. These
benefits are a direct product of the statute.
96. 351 U.S. at 232. See Havas v. Communications Workers, 509 F. Supp. 144, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1981);
Lykins v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 510 F Supp. 21, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1980); accord Linscott v. Millers
Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1971).
97. Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956).
98. 351 U.S. at 232 n.4 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
99. Harry H. Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 70 YALE
L. 345, 356-57 (1961).
100. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082-83 (1991); accordLugarv. Edmond-
son Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
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Congress provided exclusivity in the NLRA because it determined that
"collective bargaining can be really effective only when workers are sufficiently
solidified in their interests to make one agreement covering all.' 1"
As Charlton Ogburn of the American Federation of Labor testified at the time,
"To have ... equality of bargaining power the workers in each plant must
present a united front in dealing with their employer... Employers know full
well that so long as they can keep the employees divided into rival groups there
can be no collective bargaining."'
1 2
Exclusivity ensures that the union elected by the majority of employees
represents all of the employees, regardless of whether dissenting employees
support the union. 03 The collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the
union is then binding upon all employees." This provision of the NLRA
significantly increases a union's bargaining power. Even if forty-nine percent
of the employees vote against the union, the union will be able to speak for all
employees in negotiations.
The unions are guaranteed the benefit of exclusivity because employers are
compelled to abide by such agreements regardless of how they view them. An
employer commits an unfair labor practice when it refuses to bargain with the
union chosen to represent the majority of workers, even if that employer favors
the position of the dissenting union members. 05
At the same time, the exclusivity provision of the NLRA deprives employ-
ees of an important right."° Because the NLRA mandates exclusivity in nego-
tiations, it "extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own
relations with his employer."' 7 An employee who believes that he is capable
of negotiating better terms independently is prohibited from doing so. Instead,
she must seek employment on the terms negotiated by the union. This depriva-
tion stems directly from the grant of power to the union to negotiate on behalf
of all employees.
101. Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education & Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 43
(1935); see also Ruth Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L REV. 556 (1945).
102. Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., Ist Sess.
151 (1935) (testimony of Charlton Ogburn, Counsel for American Federation of Labor).
103. The National Labor Relations Act, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988), provides: "Representatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining ...."
See also Railway Labor Act, § 2, Fourth, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1988) ("The majority of any craft or class
of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the
purposes of this chapter.").
104. The policy of exclusive representation was held to be constitutional by the Supreme Courtin 1944
when it rejected challenges to the relevant provisions of both the RLA and the NLRA. J.1. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (NLRA); Order of R.R. Tels. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342
(1944) (RLA).
105. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678,684 (1944) (bargaining directly with employees
"would be subversive of the mode of collective bargaining which the statute has ordained"); Labor Board
v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44 (1936).
106. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1940).
107. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
1150 [Vol. 101: 1135
Union Shop Provisions
A second source of union strength is the NLRA's authorization of union
shop agreements. 103 In states that have not prohibited union shops, all employ-
ees must pay union dues,'09 even though those employees opposed to the
union do not have to participate in union activities in any other way.110 Con-
gress added this provision out of a concern that "if there is not a closed shop
those not in the union will get a free ride, that the union does the work, gets
the wages raised, then the man who does not pay dues rides along freely
without any expense to himself.""' The dues requirement would therefore
create a sense of equality between all employees that could ultimately promote
industrial peace."'
The ability to negotiate union shop provisions enables unions to collect
financial dues from all employees. While dissenting employees who oppose the
union do not have to participate in union activities in any other way, the
payment of "their share of financial support" provides the union with additional
resources to increase its strength.13 In this way, unions are guaranteed a
significant level of financial support regardless of the popular support they
enjoy.
Just as the NLRA requires employers to negotiate exclusively with the
union, it also compels employers to accept union shop provisions. It is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse to negotiate over a union shop provi-
sion.' "4 Once such an agreement has been negotiated, the employer may be
obligated to facilitate its implementation by agreeing to provisions such as
check-off requirements, in which union dues are deducted from paychecks."'
In addition, an employer cormmits an unfair labor practice, and is subject to
state sanctions, when he refuses to discharge employees who do not pay their
union dues."
6
This obligation to fund the union harms employees because it deprives them
of the right to withhold funding for causes they find antithetical to their inter-
ests. For example, they may be convinced that the collective bargaining agree-
ment does not serve their interests because they could negotiate a better agree-
ment on their own. 17 In addition, their mandatory dues can be used for a
variety of purposes beyond collective bargaining, such as lobbying activities,
108. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988); see also Railway Labor Act,
§ 2, Eleventh (a), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1988) (same for RLA).
109. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(3).
110. Communications workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,757-59 (1988); NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,
373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963); HAGGARD, supra note 12, at 37.
111. 93 CONG. REc. 4887 (1947) (testimony of Sen. Taft).
112. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 6, at 85-91 (summarizing legislative history).
113. Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954).
114. Queen Mary Restaurants Corp. v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1977).
115. Matter of Indep. Stave Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 219, 220 (1979).
116. See id.; Matter of Montgomery Ward & Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 369 (1966); Glenn A. Zipp, Rights
and Responsibilities of Parties to a Union Security Agreement, 33 LAB. LJ. 202, 212 (1982).
117. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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public relations, litigation, and social activities.118 Absent the NLRA, dissent-
ing union members would not be compelled to fund such activities.
Although a number of states have chosen to prohibit union shop provi-
sions,1 9 their decision provides little consolation to employees in the twenty-
nine states that permit such agreements. In those states, union shop provisions
are still enforceable through exclusivity provisions negotiated under the federal
statute. The federal statute plays a significant role because it is the NLRA that
compels dissenting employees in those states to pay the dues.
Thus, the first part of the Lugar test is met because the alleged constitution-
al deprivation-the payment of union dues in violation of the First Amend-
ment-stems directly from the union's statutory right to compel the dues under
the NLRA. This conclusion is consistent with the application of the test in
Lugar and Leesville Concrete. In Lugar, the Court found that the first part of
the test it created was met because the prejudgment attachments of property
occurred through a "procedural scheme created by the statute [that] obviously
is the product of state action."1 20 In Leesville Concrete, the Court reasoned
that the first part of the test was met because peremptory challenges constitute
an exercise of government power "permitted only when the government, by
statute or decisional law" authorizes their use.11 Thus, "[w]ithout this autho-
rization, granted by an Act of Congress itself, Leesville would not have been
able to engage in the alleged discriminatory acts.""2 Similarly, without the
authority of the NLRA, labor unions would not be in a position to function as
the exclusive representatives of all employees and to negotiate union shop
provisions.
B. Part Two of the State Action Test
The second part of the state action test involves consideration of "whether
the private party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness
as a state actor."23 In the most literal sense, a labor union is obviously not
a state official; however, because the union "has obtained significant aid from
state officials" it "may fairly be said to be a 'state actor"' under the second part
of the Lugar test." The role of government regulations under the Jackson
nexus test buttresses this conclusion.
118. This is not to say that a finding of state action should lead to a prohibition on all such expendi-
tures. It may very well be that the Court would find such expenditures justified by a compelling state
interest. See, e.g., Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233-34 (1956); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,222 (1977). The argument being made is that a consideration of the constitution-
al merits would force that interest to be weighed against the infringement on employees' interests.
119. See supra text accompanying note 94.
120. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982).
121. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Il1 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991).
122. Id.
123. Id.; accord Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
124. 457 U.S. at 937.
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The NLRA provides significant aid to the union by empowering it to
negotiate on behalf of all employees, and by enabling it to negotiate union
security agreements that compel all employees to pay dues to it. As the analysis
of the first part of the Lugar test demonstrated, this assistance provides unions
with much greater strength than they would otherwise possess."z Whether
or not this assistance is good policy, there is no doubt that as a positive matter,
it is part of a deliberate federal policy. Without that assistance, unions would
not be in a position to negotiate exclusively on behalf of all employees or to
bind dissenting employees to join the union by negotiating union shop provi-
sions.
A comparison with the pre-NLRA status quo further demonstrates the
significance of the aid. Before the enactment of the federal labor law statutes,
unions did not have exclusive authority to negotiate on behalf of all employees.
Instead, all employees could either work under the terms negotiated by the
union or negotiate an independent arrangement with the employer.1" "The
legislative adoption of the majority rule principle as the central concept of the
collective bargaining structure constitute[d] a complete repudiation of all
previous judicial efforts to deal with the problem."'127
Union shop provisions were also subject to a number of legal obstacles
before the enactment of the NLRA. For a period of time, unions that negotiated
union shop provisions could face criminal conspiracy charges. 12s After the
use of conspiracy charges began to decline following the 1842 decision of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Hunt,129 a number of
cases held that a union seeking to negotiate or enforce a union shop provision
could face civil liability.1
30
125. The argument in favor of state action under the Lugar framework appears to involve some
"bootstrapping" because the federal labor statutes are used to meet both requirements of the test. The statute,
however, functions differently in the two elements of the test. While the first part of the test uses it to
demonstrate that federal law is the basis for the deprivation of employees' rights, the second part uses it
to demonstrate the significant role the government plays in regulating collective bargaining. Similarly, in
Leesville Concrete the relevant statutes were applied to meet both elements of the Lugar test. See 111 S. Ct.
at 2083 (first part); id. at 2084-85 (second part).
126. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 102 (1936) (McReynolds, J., dissenting);
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Yazoo & M.V.R.R.V. Co. v. Webb, 64 F.2d 902, 903 (5th
Cir. 1933); see also Minier Sargent. Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining Under Section 7(a), 29 ILL.
L. REV. 275 (1934) (discussing individual right not to participate in majority's collective bargaining agree-
ment).
127. WVeyand, supra note 101, at 559.
128. See HAGGARD, supra note 12, at 11-17.
129. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
130. See, e.g., Moore Drop Frying Co. v. McCarthy, 243 Mass. 554 (1923) (inducing breach of contract
by seeking closed shop agreement); Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353 (1905) (successful tort suit by
employee who was discharged for refusing to join the union); Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 (1900)
(damages against union striking over union shop provision). But see National Protective Ass'n of Steam
Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315 (1902) (denying injunction). See generally HAGGARD, supra note 12,
at 17-24.
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Some scholars in labor law, 3' as well as certain governments of other
nations, 13 2 have favored an approach that permits the existence of multiple
unions. Such a system could be adopted in the United States in lieu of exclusiv-
ity and union shop provisions. This alternative would allow all employees
opposed to a particular union to join a different union and negotiate inde-
pendently. This Note does not recommend that Congress adopt such an ap-
proach and return to the pre-NLRA era because many good reasons favor
maintaining the current system. 33 Rather, this alternative is noted in order
to emphasize that the status quo is part of a system established by the govern-
ment and not something that arose from purely private action.134
This recognition of the role of federal aid in meeting the second part of the
Lugar test is supported by the Court's reasoning in Leesville Concrete, which
used a "but for" analysis to determine that the second part of the state action
test had been met. The Court explained that "a private party could not exercise
its peremptory challenges absent the overt, significant assistance of the
Court."'135 It based this conclusion on the fact that the litigant was only able
to exercise his right to peremptory challenges because of the statutorily created
system of juries and peremptory challenges. Similarly, a union is only able to
exercise its authority over dissenting union members by virtue of the provisions
of the NLRA increasing unions' power and authority.
The role of exclusivity in creating state action is also consistent with the
Jackson nexus test. It is not simply that labor law is heavily regulated, but
rather that the particular functions at issue-the right to negotiate exclusively
and the power to negotiate union shop provisions-are governed by the labor
statute. In Jackson, Rendell-Baker, and Blum, the Court found no state action
because the particular policy decisions, although made by regulated entities,
were not themselves regulated. 136 In contrast, when union shop provisions are
negotiated under the NLRA, a federal policy directly causes the deprivation of
rights. Without the provisions for exclusivity and union shop agreements,
dissenting employees simply would not be obliged to pay dues.
The Court has previously recognized this link between federal labor law
policy and its effect on individual workers. For example, in NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Co., the Court explained that "the national labor
131. E.g., George W. Brooks, Stability Versus Employee Free Choice, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 344, 351
(1976) ("Why should a union be any stronger than is desired by the people it represents?"); George Schatzki,
Majority Rule. Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be
Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897 (1975) (arguing that unions have been given unduly significant power
over employees to compensate for employer power over union).
132. See Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1394, 1425-30 (1971); Schatzki, supra note 131, at 919 n.53.
133. See supra notes 101-02, 108-12 and accompanying text.
134. See ARCHImALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 362 (1lth ed. 1991) ("In sum,
Congress has to a considerable degree replaced a bargaining structure based on volunteerism and economic
force with one based on legal compulsion.").
135. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (1991) (emphasis added).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88.
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policy vested unions with power to order the relations of employees with their
employer."'137 Similarly, in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, the
Court recognized that union "authority derives in part from Government's
thumb on the scales."'138 Like those decisions, this Note acknowledges the
important role the federal government plays in shaping union actions.
In addition, while the Court has not explicitly found state action in union
shop agreements negotiated under the NLRA, in two other cases it strongly
intimated that state action exists under the statute. In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.
Co."9 and Vaca v. Sipes,"4 the Court considered the challenges of employ-
ees who claimed that they were subject to mistreatment as a result of the power
wielded by a union under the system of exclusive representation. In both cases
the Court suggested that if it could not have ruled for petitioners on statutory
grounds, it would have done so on constitutional grounds. These cases demon-
strate that the Court's precedents support the conclusion that union action can
rise to the level of state action.
In Steele, the majority union, which was governed by the RLA, negotiated
an agreement to eliminate gradually the jobs of all black employees and to hire
white workers as replacements. The Court explained that if the RLA was not
held to prohibit such an agreement, "constitutional questions arise. For the
representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is
subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or
discriminate against the rights of those for whom it legislates." 41 The Court
avoided reaching the constitutional issue because it held that the statute itself
imposed an obligation to represent all members of the union fairly.'42 While
this was an RLA case, its language addresses powers that are identical under
the NLRA.
In Vaca v. Sipes, the Court considered an employee's challenge to the
failure of a union to pursue an employee grievance. 43 In deciding the case,
the Court rejected the argument that the National Labor Relations Board had
exclusive jurisdiction over the challenge. It explained that more fundamental
issues were at stake because, as it had held in Steele, "the congressional grant
of power to a union to act as exclusive collective bargaining representative...
would raise grave constitutional problems" if that power were misused.'"
Vaca, which was decided under the NLRA, suggests a recognition by the Court
137. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967).
138. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1940).
139. 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944).
140. 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
141. 323 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 199.
143. 386 U.S. at 171.
144. Id. at 182.
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of exactly what it attempted to deny in Beck145-- that exclusive representation
was imposed by Congress and has a coercive effect.
Vaca and Steele both demonstrate that in the past the Court has been
receptive to the idea of finding state action under the NLRA. In addition, these
decisions reflect an understanding of the "significant aid" that unions receive
from the government. Although Vaca and Steele predate Lugar, the reasoning
in both cases is in accord with the second element of Lugar's two-part test. In
contrast, the two cases cited in the Beck dictum fail to analyze the issue of
exclusivity and are easily distinguishable.
In the first of these cases, United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski,'46 union
members challenged an internal election rule that prohibited "outsider" contri-
butions to candidates running in union elections. In a footnote to the opinion,
the Court briefly stated that because the rule did not involve state action, the
union policy could not be challenged on First Amendment grounds.147 Two
factors distinguish Sadlowski. First, union elections are more of an internal
matter than are collective bargaining agreements. While elections may indirectly
affect dissenting employees, collective bargaining agreements more acutely
affect them because they establish the terms of employment. Second, unlike the
case of union shop provisions considered in this Note, the election contributions
rule is not a matter specifically authorized by the NLRA.
In the other case, United Steelworkers v. Weber, the Court considered a
Title VII challenge to an affirmative action plan voluntarily negotiated by an
employer and a union.141 In its decision, the Court noted: "Since the Kaiser-
USWA plan does not involve state action, this case does not present an alleged
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
1 49
Beyond that single statement, the Court provided no analysis or explanation for
the absence of state action, perhaps because the issue was not raised in the
suit.150 Since the issue was not raised, it is unclear why the Court felt the
need to note the lack of state action. A compelling argument exists that state
action occurs in the negotiation of affirmative action provisions because they
have a binding effect on all employees.1 51 Thus, had Beck devoted more
attention to the state action question, Sadlowski and Weber would not have
prohibited a finding of state action.
Justice Douglas recognized the significance of the federal government's role
in providing aid to the union through union shop provisions in 1974 when he
dissented from a denial of certiorari in Buckley v. American Federation of
145. Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
146. 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
147. Id. at 121 n.16.
148. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
149. Id. at 200.
150. Brief for Respondent, Weber (No. 78-432).
151. See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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Television and Radio Artists.1 52 In arguing that the Court should have heard
the case, which involved a First Amendment challenge to compulsory union
dues, Douglas explained that the federal labor statutes provided sufficient aid
to the union to create state action:
When Congress authorizes an employer and a union to enter into
union-shop agreements and makes such agreements binding and en-
forceable over the dissents of a minority of employees or union mem-
bers, it has cast the weight of the Federal Government behind the
agreements just as surely as if it had imposed them by statute. 53
Justice Douglas emphasized that the aid resulted from the fact that the govern-
ment, "by its approval and enforcement of union-shop agreements, may be said
to 'encourage' and foster such agreements." 54
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that when parties governed by the NLRA negotiate
union security agreements, state action is present. Consequently, employees
should be able to challenge the constitutionality of such agreements. As the
RLA cases demonstrate, such a challenge would not lead to the prohibition of
all union shop agreements because compelling state interests may justify the
authorization of such agreements. 55 A finding of state action would, however,
likely lead the Court to prohibit some statutorily authorized union expenditures
as violations of the First Amendment. 56 At some point in the future the Court
will face this issue,157 and a recognition of state action could therefore have,
at the very least, important financial consequences for individual employees.
Yet, this conclusion also suggests that a recognition of the role of the
NLRA's exclusivity provision in creating state action could have implications
for other areas of labor law. For example, while Vaca v. Sipes created a
statutory duty of fair representation for the pursuance of employee grievanc-
es, 58 that obligation provides only limited protection for individual employ-
152. 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
153. Id. at 1095 (Douglas, 3., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
154. Id.
155. See Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233-35 (1956).
156. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 465 U.S. 435, 455-57 (1984) (First
Amendment prohibits use of dissenting members' dues for some union expenditures authorized by RLA);
Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1963-64 (1991) (prohibiting public unions' expenditures
for publications and national conventions with money paid by dissenting union members); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223 (First Amendment prohibits some expenditures by public union with
dissenting members' dues).
157. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 6, at 117.
158. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1966).
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ees. 59 In fact, at least one circuit has held that under the statutory duty of
fair representation, a union "is not liable... for careless or boneheaded con-
duct."1" A finding of state action under the NLRA might enhance individual
employee rights by obliging a union to meet due process standards before
deciding not to pursue an employee's grievance. Similarly, if the Court in
Weber161 had found state action, it would have analyzed the affirmative action
plan at issue under the Equal Protection Clause standards, in addition to
considering its legality under Title V1.162 A recognition of state action might
also affect the right of unions to fine individual employees who cross picket
lines.1
63
These issues are complex, and a full analysis of them would require a more
indepth treatment than this Note provides. In some cases, the state interest
supporting the exclusivity provision and the particular union power at issue may
outweigh any infringement on employee rights. A finding of state action would
therefore not be likely to result in a wholesale reform of labor law. It would,
however, lead to an enhancement of the rights of individual employees.
159. See United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 110 S. Ct. 904, 911 (1990) ("purposefully limited check");
Note, Public Sector Grievance Procedures, Due Process and the Duty of Fair Representation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 752, 782 (1976) ("[A] combination of the good faith test and the courts' general reluctance to
overturn arbitration awards makes vindication of the employee's rights unlikely.").
160. Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton Water Towers, 786 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1986).
161. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
162. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 n.2 (1987).
163. Although employees have the option of resigning from the union to avoid the fine, they are often
not aware of this right until the strike has begun, and resignation is no longer an option. See Harry H.
Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 YALE L.J 1022 (1976). The right to fine may involve
state action because it is "integral to... federal labor policy." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175, 181 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
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